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Any man of sound head, and practised in wielding logic with a
scholastic adroitness, might take up the whole academy of modern
economists, and throttle them between heaven and earth with his finger
and thumb, or bray their fungus heads to powder with a lady's fan.1
In his novel Hard Times, Charles Dickens encapsulates one view of Jeremy Bentham
by representing him in the person of Mr Gradgrind, who tells little Louisa never to
wonder: ‘By means of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, settle
everything somehow, and never wonder’.
This kind of bad press continues to this day in works like A. N. Wilson's
Victorians, in which the author applies the word Benthamite to any economic
development of which he disapproves, so that Bentham is simultaneously held
responsible not only for all the crimes of authoritarian socialism, but also for the
excesses of laissez-faire capitalism.2
I see no hope of countering this kind of mindless prejudice. As a supposedly
heartless technocrat myself, I know that anyone intolerant of logical contradiction and
willing to use mathematics in reasoning about human affairs still gets the same
treatment today from do-gooders who resent the impracticalities of their utopian
schemes being exposed by rational analysis. Unable to reply in kind, they resort to
misrepresentation and character assassination. Bentham's deliberately provocative
style doubtless fanned the flames of the criticism to which he was subjected in his
own time, but the disgraceful treatment meted out to Edward Wilson in recent years
for expressing his sociobiological views shows that the soft answer sufficeth not to
turn away the wrath of utopians confronted with scientific facts that they dislike.
1 Thomas de Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium Eater, London, 1821.
2 A. N. Wilson, The Victorians, New York, 2003.
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I am more interested in the fact that Bentham's reputation among modern
scholars with no irrational axe to grind should be so low. His name is always twinned
with that of John Stuart Mill when credit for utilitarianism is given, with the unspoken
implication that the eccentric Bentham may have hit upon the phrase ‘the greatest
good for the greatest number’, but Mill was the serious thinker who provided
utilitarianism with sound intellectual foundations.3
It is true that Bentham was eccentric. The continuing display of his mummified
corpse in the foyer of University College London as specified in his will is the most
obvious of his many oddities. His obsession with building a circular prison in which a
warder placed at the center could simultaneously monitor the behaviour of many
prisoners is another. But it makes no sense to judge a creative genius by what we
perceive as their follies. Otherwise it would be necessary to condemn Isaac Newton
for his attempts to advance alchemy and numerology. As a famous old mathematician
once explained to me after we had listened to some criticism of the work of a recently
dead colleague: a man's achievements should be judged by his f+, which is what is
left after throwing the negative values of a function away.
John Stuart Mill
I am sure that John Stuart Mill had no evil intentions in writing an assessment of
Jeremy Bentham after his death, in which he drew a parallel between Bentham, and
the poet and would-be philosopher, Samuel Coleridge.4 However, this assessment set
in stone what still remains the modern view of Bentham: a minor celebrity in his time,
but not a philosopher of the first rank.
Mill was particularly exercised by Bentham's refusal to be influenced by the
school of German idealists, who were philosophically fashionable in England at that
time. But it seems to me that, in such passages, Mill criticises Bentham for not being
subject to his own weaknesses. After all, how can one follow up the insights of the
Scottish Enlightenment as represented by David Hume, and simultaneously give
3 I am grateful to my colleague Fred Rosen for pointing out that Bentham probably derived this formula
neither from Hutcheson nor from Leibnitz, but from Beccaria's Crimes and Punishments. Bentham
himself attributed his utilitarian ideas to Helvetius. See R. Shackleton, ‘“The Greatest Happiness of the
Greatest Number: The History of Bentham’s Phrase”’, Studies on Voltaire, vol. 90 (1972), pp. 1461-
1482.
4 ‘Bentham’ and ‘Coleridge’ in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. X: Essays on Ethics,
Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson, F. E. L. Priestley, and D.P. Dryer, Toronto, 1985, pp. 75-116,
and 117-164. Henceforth CWJSM.
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credence to the categorical denials of this approach embraced by Immanuel Kant?
Such fudging was totally alien to Bentham, who did all his own thinking for himself
and followed the logic wherever it led, however unpopular or unfashionable his
conclusions might prove to be.
Nor does the view that Mill came up with intellectual foundations for
utilitarianism that Bentham was unable to provide survive serious scrutiny. The much
quoted chapter in which Mill supposedly provides such a foundation actually reduces
to an ineffectual attempt to prove that what people want is happiness.5 But what we
need to know is what happiness is. How is it measured? Why should we add one
person's happiness to another's? And so on. Nor is his attempt to show that the
utilitarian creed is necessarily libertarian any more successful.6 In both cases, Mill
allows his conviction of the truth of the conclusion he is determined to reach to
overcome his critical faculties in a manner that would have been impossible for
Bentham.
This isn't to say that Bentham didn't also subscribe to convictions for which he
was unable to provide a rigorous defence. But when he finds himself in this position,
he doesn't deceive himself or others by offering the kind of waffle that he so
condemned when he found it in the works of Blackstone and others—he simply
explains that the proposition in question is to be treated as axiomatic. On what he calls
the Principle of Utility, for example, Bentham observes that a proof is as ‘impossible
as it is needless’.7
David Hume.
My own view is that the time has come for the history of thought to accord Jeremy
Bentham a more prominent position in the line of scientific philosophers that starts
with Aristotle, and was continued by the likes of Epicurus, Hobbes, and Hume.
I think the link with the great David Hume is particularly important, since both
Hume and Bentham were sufficiently ahead of their time that it is only with the
advent of modern game theory that lesser minds have been able to find a framework
within which their insights can sit comfortably.
5 ‘Utilitarianism’ in Ibid., pp. 203-60.
6 ‘On Liberty’ in CWJSM Vol. XVIII: Essays on Politics and Society, Part I, Toronto, 1977, pp. 213-
310.
7 An Introduction to the Priniciples of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart,
Oxford, 1996 (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), p. 13. Henceforth IPML (CW).
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My intention in this paper is to pursue this point by discussing Bentham's
insights in the light of the work of modern economists like John Harsanyi, who have
used game theory to take up where Hume and Bentham left off. In the process, I hope
it will become clear that the sharp distinction between egalitarianism and
utilitarianism perceived by modern philosophers is not something that can be traced
back to Bentham, who has a good claim to have fathered both ways of looking at the
world.
Three Questions
There are three questions that no utilitarian can evade:
 What constitutes utility?
 Why should individual utilities be added?
 Why should I maximize the sum of utilities rather than my own?
The early utilitarians had little to offer in answer to the first and second of these
questions. With characteristic frankness, Bentham says, ‘[t]hat which is used to prove
everything, cannot itself be proved’.8 As for the additivity of happiness, this is
quaintly described as a ‘fictitious postulatum’.
Mill sometimes endorses this position, but also offers a halfhearted attempt at
providing a proof of utilitarianism, which consists of a chapter devoted to the claim
that what people desire is happiness.9 Having established this proposition to his own
satisfaction, he then rests on his laurels––apparently not feeling the need to tackle the
second question.10
Sidgwick seems uninterested in foundational questions, but agrees with
Bentham that the good is an ‘unanalyzable notion’.11 Only Edgeworth12 is an
exception to this Victorian intellectual vacuum, anticipating with his insurance
8 IPML, p. 13
9 CWJSM, pp. 209-26.
10 All he offers on the second question is the observation: ‘Each person's happiness is a good to that
person, and the general happiness is therefore a good to the aggregate of all persons’.
11 H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Indianoplis, 1907.
12 F. Edgeworth, Mathematical Physics, London, 1881.
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argument the defense of utilitarianism offered nearly a century later by William
Vickrey and John Harsanyi.13
The third question is more interesting from the historical point of view, because
I believe that Bentham's position on this subject differs radically from that of most of
his utilitarian successors. His focus on the practicalities of the law leads him to a
position very close to that of David Hume on how social conventions are maintained
in human societies.
Skyhooks
Neither Hume nor Bentham are willing to have any truck with what have nowadays
come to be called ‘skyhooks’ by evolutionary theorists.14 These are metaphysical or
supernatural entities that utopians conjure from nowhere to hold aloft their castles in
the air. Bentham is particularly scathing on this subject. Everybody knows, for
example, of his rejection of the notion of imprescriptible natural rights as ‘nonsense
upon stilts’ in his brilliant commentary on the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, but he is equally stout in denying all notions of natural law, however attractive
the packaging in which it may be wrapped.15 As he observes ‘Instead of the phrase,
Natural Law, you have sometimes, Law of Reason, Right Reason, Natural Justice,
Natural Equity, Good Order’.16 Only the names of such skyhooks have changed in
modern times. For example, modern Kantians like Harsanyi or Rawls appeal to Moral
Commitment or Natural Duty to explain why people should follow their
prescriptions.17 But for Hume or Bentham, one might as well appeal to Mumbo-
Jumbo, or one of the many other supernatural beings that mankind has invented over
the years.
Punishment
Bentham was not nearly so subtle in his assessment of how morality really works in
actual societies as David Hume, but his insistence that the fear of punishment is at the
root of moral behaviour puts him very much in the modern camp of those who see the
13 J. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations,
Cambridge, 1977.
14 Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, London, 1995.
15 Rights, Representation and Reform: Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French
Revolution, ed. P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin and C. Blamires, Oxford, 2002 (CW), pp. 317-401.
16 IPML, p. 27n.
17 Harsanyi, Rational Behavior; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1972.
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folk theorem of repeated game theory as fundamental in explaining what it means to
enjoy the rights and duties implicit in a social contract . As he observes ‘Without the
notion of punishment… no notion can we have of either right or duty.18
His later concerns about the abuse of power by those in government similarly
echo some of David Hume's concerns. Everyone in society—including popes, kings,
presidents, judges and policemen—needs to be properly incentified by the fear of
punishment if they are to carry out their duties to the benefit of the society as a whole,
rather than in pursuit of their own private ends.
I think this feature of Bentham's work has been badly neglected by posterity. His
pragmatic view of human nature is seen as crude and demeaning when compared with
the grandiose refinements proposed by philosophers who are more adept at telling us
what we like to hear. But I think that the folk theorem provides a vindication of both
Bentham and Hume on this subject. Sages from Confucius onwards have identified
reciprocity as the secret of human sociality—and reciprocity works because those
who fail to reciprocate are punished.19 As Hume understood better than Bentham, the
punishments are commonly much more subtle than the legal remedies on which
Bentham concentrated, but Bentham was correct in identifying punishment as the
crucial factor without which a moral code cannot be sustained.
The rest of this paper is structured by taking the three questions that open this
section one by one, looking at what modern scholarship has made of them with a view
to assessing Bentham's foresight. In undertaking this task, I was surprised to find that
he was far less doctrinaire than I had always taken for granted––and much closer to
my own position than I had thought possible.20
What is Utility?
In this section, I offer a brief sketch of the history of utility theory with a view to
explaining the origins and tenets of the modern theory.
18 A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment of Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart,
London, 1977 (CW), p. 495n.
19 What of reward? In modern thinking, failing to secure a reward counts as a punishment––an
opportunity cost. Since Bentham invented the notion of an opportunity cost, it is disappointing to find
numerous passages in his work in which he talks simultaneously of maximizing a benefit and
minimizing a cost, although one can only optimize on one dimension at a time.
20 In my book Natural Justice, New York, 2005––a title of which Bentham would not have approved––
I offer a non-technical account of my own take on both utilitarianism and egalitarianism.
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The word utility has always been difficult. Bentham himself opens his
Principles of Morals and Legislation by remarking that his earlier work would have
been better understood if he had used happiness or felicity instead.21 The emergence
of modern utility theory has only served to multiply the philosophical confusion. For
example, Amartya Sen denied that John Harsanyi can properly be counted as a
utilitarian at all, because Harsanyi interpreted utility in the modern sense of von
Neumann and Morgenstern rather than in Bentham's original sense.22
But I see no reason why we should suppose that Bentham would have rejected
the modern theory of utility if he could have had foreknowledge of its existence. It is
certainly very much closer to his idea that we should root a moral theory in the real
wants and aspirations of human individuals than the approach of those modern
utilitarian philosophers who compile lists of criteria that supposedly determine what
the good life ought to be. I fear that Bentham would have had little patience with
paternalists who think they know better what is good for you and me than we do
ourselves. He even coined a name for this kind of dogooder. He called them
ipsedixists—those who think their own aspirations for society are somehow
automatically superior to the aspirations of others.
Pleasure or pain?
Bentham perhaps thought that some kind of metering device might eventually be
wired into a brain to measure how much pleasure or pain a person was experiencing.
This is a view that economists in the early part of the twentieth century learned to
lampoon mercilessly. It is true that such a naive theory of human motivation creates
many difficulties, but it does not seem to me to deserve the derision it was accorded.
After all, we all now know of experiments in which rats press a lever that excites an
electrode implanted in a ‘pleasure center’ in their brains to the exclusion of all other
options—including food and sex. However, once the so-called ‘marginalist
revolution’ had taught economists that their favourite theorems did not need the
21 IPML, p. 11n
22 A. Sen, ‘Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics’, Theory and Decision, vol. 7 (1976), pp.
243-262. I suppose it is hopeless to suggest that we start using the word felicity for Bentham's
psychological notion, in order to distinguish it from the very different manner in which modern
economists use the word utility. Following Ayer, philosophers sometimes speak of ‘preference
satisfaction’ when referring to the modern usage, but I suspect they seldom understand how radical the
change in attitude has been. See A. J. Ayer, ‘The Principle of Utility’, Jeremy Bentham and the Law: A
Symposium, ed. G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger, London, 1948, pp. 245-259.
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cardinal utility functions with which they were traditionally proved, it became
fashionable to denounce such utility functions as meaningless inventions.23
I suspect that one reason for this sea change was that it then became possible to
assert that the interpersonal comparisons of utility that are necessary for utilitarianism
to make sense could then also be denounced as meaningless. Even today, Lionel
Robbins is still quoted as an authority for such fallacious claims, although von
Neumann had already created what is now regarded as an entirely sound theory of
cardinal utility at the time he was writing.24
Revealed preference
Critics of modern utility theory usually imagine that economists still hold fast to the
primitive beliefs about the way our minds work that are implicit in the work of
Bentham and Mill, but economists gave up trying to be psychologists a long time ago.
Far from maintaining that our brains are little machines for generating utility, the
modern theory of utility makes a virtue of assuming nothing whatever about what
causes our behaviour.
This does not mean that economists believe that our thought processes have
nothing to do with our behaviour. They know perfectly well that human beings are
motivated by all kinds of considerations. People care about pleasure, and they care
about pain. Some are greedy for money.25 Others just want to stay out of jail. There
are even saintly people who would sell the shirt off their back rather than see a baby
cry. Economists accept that people are infinitely various but accommodate their
infinite variety within a single theory by denying themselves the luxury of speculating
about what is going on inside their heads. Instead, they pay attention only to what
they see people doing.
The modern theory of utility therefore abandons any attempt to explain why
people behave as they do. Instead of an explanatory theory, economists rest content
with a descriptive theory, which can do no more than say that a person will be acting
23 A cardinal utility scale operates like a temperature scale, with utils replacing degrees. It is normally
contrasted with an ordinal utility scale, in which the amount by which the utility of one outcome
exceeds the utility of another outcome is held to be meaningless.
24 L. Robbins, ‘Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility’, Economic Journal, vol. 48 (1938), pp. 635-641;
J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton, 1944.
25 Bentham suggests at one point that we should measure felicity in money, as in modern cost-benefit
analyses, but who would want to argue that an extra dollar is worth the same to a billionaire as to a
beggar?
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inconsistently if he or she did such-and-such in the past, but now plans to do so-and-
so in the future.
Such a theory is rooted in observed behaviour. Following Samuelson, it is
therefore called a theory of ‘revealed preference’, because the data it uses in
determining what people want is not what they say they want––or what paternalists
say they ought to want––but observations of what they actually choose when given
the opportunity.26
Rationality as consistency
Oskar Morgenstern famously turned up at von Neumann's house one day in the early
forties complaining that they didn't have a proper basis for the payoffs in the book on
game theory they were writing together. So von Neumann invented a theory on the
spot that measures how much a rational person wants something by the size of the risk
he is willing to take to get it.
Critics sometimes complain that a person's attitude to taking risks is irrelevant to
morality, but it is hard to think of a more fundamental issue than who should bear
what risk. Utilitarians who want to use the kind of insurance argument employed by
Edgeworth or Harsanyi in defence of their position certainly have no choice but to
accept that attitudes to risk are basic to their approach. Bentham's insistence on
prioritizing security fits neatly into the same package.27 Nor is there any lack of
support from traditional sources. As it says in the Book of Proverbs: it is the lot that
causeth contentions to cease.
The rationality assumptions built into Von Neumann's theory simply require that
people make decisions in a consistent way, but his conclusions are surprisingly strong.
Anyone who chooses consistently in risky situations will look to an observer as
though he or she were trying to maximize the expected value of something. This
abstract ‘something’ is what is called utility in the modern theory. To maximize its
expected value is simply to take whatever action will make it largest on average.
Philosophers sometimes claim that rationality should mean more than mere
consistency, so that some utility functions can be dismissed as being less rational than
26 P. Samuelson, ‘A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour’, Economica, vol. 5 (1938), pp.
61-71.
27 Although taking the modern view requires transferring security questions from an analysis of what is
optimal to an analysis of what is feasible. That is to say, security questions are built into each citizen's
utility function, and therefore do not need to be considered separately when maximizing the sum of
utility.
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others. However, modern economists follow Hume in treating reason as the ‘slave of
the passions’. There can then be nothing irrational about consistently pursuing any
end whatever. As Hume extravagantly observed, it would not be irrational for him to
prefer the destruction of the entire universe to scratching his finger, because
rationality is about means rather than ends.
Determining your utility
Von Neumann's theory makes it easy to find a utility function that describes a person's
behaviour if enough data is available on the choices he or she has made in the past
between risky prospects.
Pick two outcomes, WIN and LOSE, that are respectively better and worse than
than any outcome that we need to discuss. (One can think of WIN and LOSE as
winning or losing everything that there is to be won or lost.) These outcomes will
correspond to the boiling and freezing points used to calibrate a thermometer, in that
the utility scale to be constructed will assign 0 utils to LOSE, and 100 utils to WIN.
Suppose we now want to find David Hume's utility for scratching his finger. For
this purpose, consider a bunch of (free) lottery tickets in which the prizes are either
WIN or LOSE. As we offer Hume lottery tickets with higher and higher probabilities
of getting WIN as an alternative to scratching his finger, he will eventually switch
from saying no to saying yes. If the probability of WIN on the lottery ticket that makes
him switch is 75%, then von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory says that scratching
his thumb should count as being worth 75 utils to Hume. Each extra percentage point
added to the indifference probability therefore corresponds to one extra util.
As with measuring temperature, it will be obvious that we are free to choose the
zero and the unit on the utility scale we construct however we like. We could, for
example, have assigned 32 utils to LOSE, and 212 utils to WIN. One then finds how
many utils a scratched finger is worth on this new scale in the same way that one
converts degrees Celsius into degrees Fahreneheit. So a scratched finger worth 75
utils on the old scale is worth 167 utils on the new scale.
My guess is that Bentham would have been delighted with the mechanical
nature of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory, which reduces evaluations of
individual welfare to ticking off boxes on a simple Gradgrindian questionnaire, but he
would also probably have made the same mistake as many economists in over-
estimating the extent to which real people make their choices in a consistent manner.
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Although the utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern performs at least as
well in predicting the behaviour of laboratory subjects as any comparable alternative
proposed by the new school of behavioural economists, it cannot be said that it
predicts very well in absolute terms.
Why Add Utilities?
To add the utilities of the citizens of a society is to take for granted that utility can be
compared across individuals. It was this possibility that economic satirists like Lionel
Robbins were most anxious to deny when heaping ridicule on the idea that cardinal
utility scales could be meaningful.
Modern students of economics are still sometimes taught the dogma that
interpersonal comparison is impossible, although von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
theory of cardinal utility is now fully accepted. The dogma is able to survive because
the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory makes no assumptions about how people
interact. Trying to use the raw utility scales the theory assigns to different people to
assess their comparative welfare therefore makes no more sense than trying to tell
which of two rooms is warmer without knowing whether the thermometers in the two
rooms are both graduated in the same kind of degrees.
Bentham was making a similar point when he observed that adding the utilities
of different individuals is like adding so many apples to so many pears.28
Ideal observer?
One objection to the idea that interpersonal comparison of utility can be possible is
the claim that it is inconsistent with the principle of revealed preference. One is asked
how such comparisons could be revealed by the choice behaviour of individuals.
John Harsanyi's cited answer is simple.29 We reveal how we make such
comparisons whenever we use a fairness criterion to decide who should get how much
of some surplus. His own favourite example is of someone who is unable to use an
expensive opera ticket, and so must now decide which of two friends would most
enjoy it as a gift.
28 ‘'Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to be as distinct as they
were before; one man's happiness will never be another man's happiness: a gain to one man is no gain
to another: you might as well pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears’. See J. R. Dinwiddy, Bentham:
Selected Writings of John Dinwiddy, ed. W. Twining, Stanford, 2004, p. 49, and M. Mack, Jeremy
Bentham: an Odyssey of Ideas, New York, 1963, p. 244.
29 Harsanyi, Rational Behavior.
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Harsanyi pursues this idea by imagining an ‘ideal observer’ or an ‘impartial
spectator’ who makes such judgments on behalf of a society.30 The decisions of the
ideal observer are assumed to satisfy the consistency requirements of the von
Neumann and Morgenstern theory. But Harsanyi confounds the traditional pessimism
of the economics profession on this front by pointing out something that ought to have
been obvious; one can add extra assumptions to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
requirements.
Harsanyi's extra assumptions amount to requiring that the ideal observer be
impersonal, in the sense that he takes account of nothing but the preferences of the
citizens of his society when making decisions. The additivity of utility––Bentham's
fictitious postulatum––is then an almost trivial consequence.31
When making decisions about who should bear what risks, the fact that the von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s assumptions require that the ideal observer maximize
his average utility forces him to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of the
citizens of his society. The weights register how the ideal observer feels it appropriate
to rescale each citizen's individual utility scale to make them comparable. After this
rescaling, the ideal observer then acts as a utilitarian by adding together each citizen's
rescaled utility to judge the worth of any reform.
The insurance argument behind this conclusion is more apparent in Harsanyi's
second defence of utilitarianism.32 In this second defence, he abandons the metaphor
of an ideal observer in favour of his own version of the Rawlsian original position,
which he invented independently of Rawls.33
The original position.
The original position is a hypothetical standpoint from which to evaluate the fairness
of different ways of organizing a society.
All citizens imagine themselves behind a veil of ignorance that conceals their
role in society. They then ask on what bargain they would agree in this imagined state
of ignorance. Since their ignorance reduces everyone to a state of equality, they will
30 Ibid., p. 49.
31 Ken Binmore, Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract vol. II, Cambridge, 1998,
Appendix B.
32 Harsanyi, Rational Behaviour.
33 Rawls, Theory.
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all agree on what kind of society is optimal. Harsanyi points out that this society will
necessarily be utilitarian, because each citizen will wish to maximize his or her
average utility on the assumption that he or she is equally likely to end up occupying
any of the possible roles in the society on which agreement is reached in the original
position.
Rawls famously derives an egalitarian conclusion from the same hypotheses, but
his analysis does not survive serious scrutiny, since it depends on rejecting the \VNM\
theory in favour of the use of the maximin principle, which makes sense only in two-
person, zero-sum games.34
Interpersonal comparison?
Harsanyi therefore offers two related arguments that offer an explanation of why
utilities should be added, but neither argument solves the more basic problem of how
and why utilities can be compared across individuals.35
In his first argument, the standard of interpersonal comparison is taken to be that
of some mythical ideal observer, but how are we poor mortals to guess what standard
of interpersonal comparison such an ideal observer would nurse in his bosom?
His second argument seems more promising on this front, but it turns out that
Harsanyi's veil of ignorance is to be taken to be so thick that citizens in the original
position forget even the standards of interpersonal comparison that operate in their
current society. In this Kantian limbo, each citizen must construct a new standard of
interpersonal comparison. Harsanyi then appeals to a dubious rationality principle—
the so-called Harsanyi doctrine—which asserts that rational people in exactly the
same situation will necessarily think exactly the same thoughts. In particular, they will
subscribe to the same standard of interpersonal comparison.
But even if the Harsanyi doctrine were sound, we poor mortals would be no
better off than with Harsanyi's first argument, since we have no more idea of what
standard of interpersonal comparison an ideally rational person would construct in
Harsanyi's original position than we do of the standard of interpersonal comparison to
be attributed to his ideal observer.
34 Ibid.
35 Harsanyi, Rational Behavior.
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Although commentators commonly overlook this point, both of Harsanyi's
arguments therefore fail to solve the problem of how and why a consensus is to be
established on how utilities can be compared across individuals.36
Naturalizing the argument
My guess is that Bentham would have been exasperated by the metaphysical aspects
of both of Harsanyi's arguments. He would have denounced the ideal observer as
more nonsense on stilts. The original position would similarly have been dismissed as
an idle fancy.
Even if citizens were willing to go through the intellectual acrobatics required
by Harsanyi's formulation of the original position, why should anyone feel bound to
honor the hypothetical deal that hypothetically would be reached if the citizens of a
society were to bargain in an hypothetical state of ignorance? Harsanyi's answer is
that the citizens have an unexplained ‘moral commitment’ to honor the deal. Rawls
says that they have a ‘natural duty’ to do the same. But we have already seen what
Bentham thought of such skyhooks.
However, perhaps Bentham would have looked more favourably on my own
naturalistic reinterpretation of Harsanyi's second argument. Hume thought it
impossible to prove the principle of scientific induction, but that we are stuck with
proceeding as though it were true because this is the way our brains work. I think the
same about the original position.
Bentham would doubtless have argued that it is as impossible to find a rational
justification for the original position as it is to prove the principle of utility, and I
agree. But I would add the Humean proviso that we have no choice but to employ
something similar to the original position, because the original position embodies the
deep structure of the fairness norms with which evolution has equipped us for the
purpose of solving the myriads of everyday coordination problems of which social life
largely consists.37
The immediate point is that such a naturalistic reinterpretation of the original
position allows us to dispense altogether with the skyhooks that Bentham so despised.
36 Harsanyi unwittingly facilitates this mistake by renormalizing everybody's utility function at an early
stage so that each of any citizen's utils is worth the same as any other citizen's utils. But such a
renormalization would not be possible if the original utility functions were not comparable in the first
place. See Harsanyi, Rational Behavior.
37 Ken Binmore, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract, vol. I, Cambridge, 1994;
Binmore, Just Playing.
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In particular, we no longer need to think in terms of some ideally rational standard of
interpersonal comparison. When people use the device of the original position in
everyday life to solve a coordination problem, they use the standards of interpersonal
comparison that have evolved in their culture for this purpose.
I guess that Bentham would have looked askance at both the moral relativism
implicit in this standpoint and its acceptance that history matters, but he surely would
have welcomed the implication that determining the relevant standard of interpersonal
comparison when applying his principle of utility is a matter of empirical observation.
Equity
The fact that Rawls38 claimed that people would agree to an egalitarian social contract
in the original position has been mentioned already. Since Rawls wrote his celebrated
Theory of Justice explicitly to provide a reasoned alternative to utilitarianism, it may
seem perverse for me to suggest that a modern Bentham might have found himself
supporting Rawls rather then Harsanyi in the rather bad-tempered little debate that
followed their discovery of each other's work.
I offer this suggestion, because Bentham repeatedly argues that the principle of
utility will tend to generate equitable distributions of economic surpluses.39 The
following quote is typical: ‘[t]he less unequal the distribution of the external
instruments of felicity is---the greater, so security be unshaken, will be the sum of
felicity itself’.40
This conclusion certainly holds when money is to be split between two identical
individuals, provided that their marginal utility for money decreases in the manner
Bentham was perhaps the first to describe in the following aside: ‘[t]he quantity of
happiness produced by a particle of wealth will be less and less at every particle’.41
But he clearly believed maximizing total utility will generate equal outcomes
over a much larger domain than moden analysts would accept. He did not overlook
altogether the fact that his principle of utility will often call for the sacrifice of the few
for the sake of the many, but one has to search his writings with a toothcomb for a
38 Rawls, Theory.
39 Bowring, ii. pp. 267-74.
40 Bowring, ii. p. 272.
41 The utilitarian sum $u(x)+u(1-x)$ is largest when $u'(x)=u'(1-x)$. If $u'(x)$ is a strictly decreasing
function of $x$ (decreasing marginal utility), then $x=1-x$, and so $x=\half$. Bowring, iii. p. 229
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suitable reference.42 But what if he had appreciated the extent to which utilitarianism
implies unequal outcomes? Would he have stood by the ‘addibility of happiness’ or
would he have considered the use of a Rawlsian social welfare function instead?
Why be a utilitarian?
Sen and Williams comment adversely on the common failure of utilitarians to come
clean on whether their theories relate to personal morality or public policy.43 To a
game theorist, this reduces to a question of enforcement. Do people maximize the sum
of everybody's utility instead of their own because this is what they think they ‘ought’
to do, or because some powerful agency will punish them if they do not?
Harsanyi took the former view.44 But if one follows Hume in believing that all
‘categorical oughts’ are just skyhooks without genuine binding power, Harsanyi's
wordplay with the concept of moral commitment lacks all conviction. It is particularly
hard to imagine Bentham swallowing such a notion. All his works, with their strong
focus on legislation, take for granted that utilitarianism is about public policy.
However, I think that critics seldom appreciate the sophistication of his views on this
subject.
Mechanism design?
When quoting Bentham and Mill as authorities, welfare economists commonly take
for granted that both followed the currently orthodox line that models government as
an agency external to society.
A government's laws and tax policy, along with the conventions and common
understandings inherited from the historical past, create the rules of a game for its
citizens to play. Given that the government is able to enforce these rules, the citizens
respond to the incentives and restrictions built into the rules by choosing strategies
42 Egalitarians who are hostile to utilitarianism never tire of telling such stories. My favourite is the
hypothetical case of a missionary who must be surrendered to cannibals so that his fellow missionaries
can escape. For Bentham on the sacrifice of the few for the sake of the many, see Bowring, xi. p. 84:
‘On every occasion in which the nature of the case renders the provision of an equal quantity of
happiness for every one of them impossible, by its being a matter of necessity, he may sacrifice a
portion of the happiness of the few, to the greater happiness of the rest’.
43 Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams, Cambridge, 1982, p. 2
44 Harsanyi, Rational Behavior. Although I do not see that this view is consistent with his emphatic
defense of rule-utilitarianism as opposed to act-utilitarianism. It seems to me that that act-utilitarianism
is what makes sense for the private morality option, and rule-utilitarianism for the public policy option.
See Binmore, Just Playing.
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that are in equilibrium––so that each player's strategy is an optimal reply to the
strategies chosen by the other citizens.
Government officials evaluate this equilibrium using a social welfare function.
Under ideal conditions, they design the rules of the civic game they create so that the
equilibrium that is eventually played maximizes the value of their welfare function. If
social welfare is measured as the sum of everybody's utility, then the government is
said to be utilitarian.
Game theorists refer to this approach as mechanism design for reasons that
Bentham would have appreciated: designing the rules of a civic game is no different
in principle to designing a machine (or a prison).
Harsanyi's first argument can be coopted to defend such a public policy
interpretation of utilitarianism. His ideal observer becomes an embodiment of an all-
powerful, benign government—a philosopher-king in the original Platonic sense. If
such a philosopher-king honors the rather mild assumptions that Harsanyi makes in
his first argument, then he will necessarily be a utilitarian. However, I do not think
that Bentham would have been at all satisfied with this welfarist conception of
utilitarianism for the following reason.
Constitutional design?
The idea that a government is to be regarded as an incorruptible, enforcement agency
that somehow exists outside society would have been as unacceptable to Bentham as
to it was to Hume when he wrote:
In constraining any system of government and fixing the several checks
and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave
and to have no other end in all his actions than private interest.45
In particular, government officials are no less players in the game of life than any
other citizen. They respond to their incentives, just like ordinary citizens. We must
expect that they will imperceptibly learn to put their own private interests before those
of the public if given long enough to learn the ropes. Those who resist such corruption
will gradually be supplanted by those who do not.
45 D. Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects: Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, i.
Edinburgh, 1741, p. 49.
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In his Principles of a Constitutional Code, and elsewhere, Bentham is explicit
on this point. He tells us that the internal adversaries, against whose evil agency
security is requisite, are the unofficial and the official. The latter are described as
follows:
The official are those evil-doers whose means of evil-doing are derived
from the share they respectively possess in the aggregate powers of
government. Among these, those of the highest grade, and in so far as
supported by those of the highest, those of every inferior grade, are
everywhere irresistible.46
In the same article, Bentham offers a very modern solution to this problem;
government should be organized so that for each of its agents:
the course prescribed by his particular interest shall on each occasion
coincide, as completely as may be, with that prescribed by his duty.47
However, Bentham's practical suggestions on how this satisfactory state of affairs can
be brought about seem naive to a modern reader, especially since Bentham was
writing in the shadow of the great David Hume, who had already exposed the heart of
the matter:
When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan
of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among
several courts, and several orders of men, we should always consider the
separate interest of each court, and each order; and, if we find that, by
the skilful division of power, the interest must necessarily, in its
operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to
be wise and happy.48
46 Bowring, ii. p. 270.
47 Ibid., p. 278.
48 Hume, Essays, i. p. 50.
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This, of course, is the recipe of ‘checks and balances’ on which the authors of the
American Constitution relied, and of which Bentham was explicit in his approval.49
Social contracts as equilibria
I think it important for the history of thought to note that Jeremy Bentham followed
David Hume in rejecting what we now call mechanism design as the appropriate
pattern for constitutional reform, since it is still taken for granted that modern
mechanism design is the appropriate model for such purposes in modern political
economy––although nobody is able to explain how the constitution is to be protected
from the abuses of the officials who supposedly enforce the rules of the game it
delineates. The following quote from the constitution of the defunct Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics would seem to say everything that needs to be said on this subject:
Article 34: Citizens of the USSR are equal before the law, without
distinction of origin, social or property status, race or nationality, sex,
education, attitude to religion, type and nature of occupation, domicile,
or other status.
Game theorists, mostly unknowingly, follow Hume on this front. He himself
followed a long line of luminaries starting with Confucius in seeing reciprocity as the
key to human sociality.
In modern game theory, Hume's insight is formalized by the folk theorem of
repeated game theory, which shows that any outcome on which the citizens of a
society might wish to contract, given the existence of adequate external enforcement,
is also available as an equilibrium when the game being played is repeated
indefinitely often, and the players care sufficiently about tomorrow to be incentified
by the rewards or punishments that an action taken today may engender in the future.
This theorem makes it possible to see how human social contracts can survive
without being suspended from imagined skyhooks. No external policeman is available
to enforce the social contract of a sovereign state, but its social contract can
nevertheless work, because its citizens police each other. This includes popes, kings,
49 Although Bentham's praise of the ‘Anglo-American United States’ seems unlikely to find favour
with modern Americans! See Bowring, ii. pp. 563-70.
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judges, and members of the official constabulary, as well as ordinary citizens like the
rest of us.
Game theory therefore offers a rigorous answer to the old question: who guards
the guardians? The traditional answer offered by philosophers from Plato to Kant is
that the chains of responsibility in an ideal state ascend upward to a philosopher-king
at the top, who does his duty for reasons that somehow never get explained. Hume's
alternative answer is that the chains of responsibility are closed. The checks and
balances built into the constitution of an efficient state result in the guardians
guarding each other.
An important consequence of this view is that it does not allow a constitution to
be thought of as the rules of a game. In formal game theory, the players cannot break
the rules of a game––the rules are taken to be inviolable. But as Bentham insists,
insofar as the laws invented by human beings are honoured by the population at large,
it is because those who choose to break them risk punishment.
If game theory is to be used in constitutional design, it is therefore necessary to
abandon the methodology of mechanism design. Instead, the game that the citizens of
a society are modeled as playing needs to be the immutable Game of Life, whose
rules are determined by the laws of physics and biology, the facts of demography and
geography, and everything else that it is beyond the power of man to alter. A social
contract can then be identified with one of the equilibria of the Game of Life.50
Choosing a social contract––which I take to include a nation's constitution and
civic code––then reduces to choosing an equilibrium from the infinite number of
equilibria available in our complex Game of Life. This choice has historically been
made by the impersonal forces of cultural evolution, but Bentham believed it possible
for us to throw away the traditions built into our social contract, and to start all over
again with a brand new social contract constructed according to rational principles.
Rights and duties.
Bentham believed, as I do, that the choice of a social contract creates the rights and
duties that less rigorous authors commonly introduce as convenient skyhooks––
50 Bentham's concern with security against the venality of officials is then absorbed into the question of
whether a proposed social contract is indeed an equilibrium. As with individual attitudes to risk,
security is therefore absorbed into the question of what is feasible.
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usually with the prefix natural in the hope of evading the necessity of providing an
explanation of their source.51
I hope I do not misrepresent Bentham's views by interpreting his notion of a
duty as an action in the Game of Life that merits punishment of some kind if not
carried out.52 The duty to punish those who merit punishment is particularly
important, since it is by this mechanism that the chains of responsibility are closed in
an efficient social contract.
Bentham is also firm on what seems to me the insightful observation that there
can be no rights without corresponding duties. In my own version of this proposition,
I make the connection explicit by defining a right to be an action that you do not have
a duty not to perform.53
I do not know to what extent others anticipated Bentham in this demystification
of the idea of a right and a duty. My guess is that no predecessor could be so explicit,
because they had no guiding principle sufficiently powerful that one might think of
using it to design a social contract from scratch.
Political legitimacy.
To what extent is it possible to defend utilitarianism as a principle with which to solve
the equilibrium selection problem that Bentham set himself? An obvious approach to
this question is to seek to employ Harsanyi's version of the original position to this
end. One can then appeal to the modern consensus that regards a government as
legitimate if and only if it has a mandate from the people for the laws it enforces.
But what is a mandate? In practical terms, it means winning an election---often
with the votes of only a smallish proportion of the full electorate, most of whom have
only a vague idea of the policies proposed by the party for whom they are voting.
It seems to be generally accepted that winning such an election will not suffice
in the case of constitutional issues, if only because of the importance of protecting
minorities from potential oppression by a majority. That is to to say, constitutions
need to be constructed in a fairer way than matters of everyday governmental policy.
But what counts as fair?
51 Bowring, ii. pp. 267-74.
52 Such punishments need neither be judicial nor severe. The fear of social disapproval from one's peer
group is usually an adequate incentive to prevent deviations from equilibrium play.
53 Binmore, Just Playing.
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One answer is that offered by Rawls and Harsanyi. A social contract is fair if it
would be agreed in the original position. I endorse this judgment, but not for the
Kantian reasons they offer. As commented earlier, I think that people commonly find
the idea of the original position attractive because it captures the deep structure of the
fairness norms that they regularly use in ordinary life when resolving everyday
coordination problems–like who should give way to whom in a narrow corridor, or
who should take how much of a dish in short supply.
So what social contract would be agreed in the original position? We have seen
that Harsanyi's answer trumps Rawls' answer when we assume the existence of an
external agency sufficiently powerful to enforce the agreed social contract. There is
therefore no difficulty in arguing, for example, that a fair constitution for a trade
union or a corporate entity will be utilitarian, because such sub-societies have the
legal system of the society as a whole to serve as an enforcement agency.
But we cannot argue in the same way for the constitution of a sovereign state.
So what happens if we analyze the bargaining problem faced by citizens in the
original position when they know that any agreement they reach must be self-
enforcing? Amongst other things, their agreement must then be proof against further
appeals to the original position in the future.
This is not the place to review my analysis of this problem, although little more
is involved than the observation that when nothing compels honouring an agreement
to abide by the fall of a coin, then only agreements in which everybody is indifferent
as to how the coin falls can be viable.54 However, the conclusion provides a surprising
vindication of Rawls’55 moral intuition. Without external enforcement, the fair social
contract agreed in the original position will be egalitarian, in the sense that each
citizen's gain (measured in suitably rescaled utils) in moving from the current status
quo will be equal.
Bentham an egalitarian!
Using modern ideas from game theory in trying to flesh out Bentham's ideas therefore
allows us to flirt with a delightful paradox. Perhaps Bentham should have been an
egalitarian rather than a utilitarian! I should hasten to explain that he would not have
54 Binmore, Just Playing.
55 Rawls, Theory.
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been a deontological56 egalitarian of the modern variety, but an egalitarian of the
consequentialist school, who maximizes the minimum of all individual utilities rather
than their sum.57
Bentham would not have needed to abandon his belief in the principle of utility
to have embraced egalitarianism for this kind of reason. Citizens in the original
position still evaluate their prospects behind the veil of ignorance by taking the
average of the utilities of everybody in the society that they are creating. They
therefore all act as good little utilitarians behind the veil of ignorance, but they see
that the lack of external enforcement implies that simply choosing the social contract
that maximizes average utility is not viable, because anyone who finds himself
disadvantaged when emerging from behind the veil of ignorance will simply call for a
renegotiation. They therefore agree instead on the best social contract that will survive
such calls for renegotiation. This social contract is the efficient social contract in
which everybody is treated equally according to the current standard of interpersonal
comparison––which we have seen is a conclusion that Bentham was anxious to
encourage.
I do not suppose that my suggestion that a modern Bentham might have
embraced egalitarianism is likely to find much support, but perhaps the idea may
provoke some reappraisal of the modern consensus on the real Bentham's beliefs and
attitudes.
It is true that those who insist on rigorous reasoning from first principles have
usually made their minds up in advance about the conclusions to which their analysis
supposedly leads;58 but I think that Bentham was one of a select few thinkers who are
genuinely willing to follow the logic wherever it leads. And sometimes logic led
Bentham to conclusions that modern utilitarians would find uncomfortably heterodox
(if they did not choose to leave the relevant passages unread).
Ogre or Prophet?
56 How did Bentham's invented term deontology come to have its present meaning as the doctrine that
the Good must be explained in terms of the Right?
57 The result would not be a society of clones for two reasons. The first is that utility would need to be
interpreted as a gain over the current status quo, reflecting the fact that Bentham's supposed radicalism
was decidedly muted. The second reason is that the feasible set would only contain equilibria of the
Game of Life, reflecting Bentham's concern with stability and security.
58 John Stuart Mill on the subject of liberty and utilitarianism is a case that readily comes to mind in the
current context.
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I guess it has to be admitted that Bentham was an ogre to the extent that he seems to
have had no gift for personal empathy. He was certainly held in great affection by
some of his young acolytes, but young men are always attracted by authority figures
who shake the foundations of the Temple of the Philistines.
However, the real question for the history of thought is not whether Bentham's
personality was deficient, or his behaviour eccentric, or his writing style quaint. All of
these things are true, and more. But what really matters is whether he directed future
research along profitable channels––and here I think posterity has failed to appreciate
his prophetic insights adequately.
John Stuart Mill was a thinker worthy of respect, but Jeremy Bentham was a
genuine landmark on the road to a scientific theory of social and political
organization.
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